Working for a Good Cause

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 11-168/3

37 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2011 Last revised: 3 Dec 2012

See all articles by Robert Dur

Robert Dur

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Robin Zoutenbier

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 24, 2011

Abstract

A rich literature in public administration has shown that public sector employees have stronger altruistic motivations than private sector employees. Recent economic theories stress the importance of mission preferences, and predict that altruistic people sort into the public sector when they subscribe to its mission. This paper uses data from a representative survey among more than 30.000 employees from 50 countries to test this prediction. We …nd strong evidence for a mutually reinforcing role of altruism and mission alignment in sorting to the public sector, particularly among highly educated workers and among workers in less-developed countries.

Keywords: public service motivation, altruism, mission preferences, sorting, World Values Survey

JEL Classification: H1, J45, M5

Suggested Citation

Dur, Robert and Zoutenbier, Robin, Working for a Good Cause (November 24, 2011). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 11-168/3, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1965414 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1965414

Robert Dur (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )

FEW / H 8-15
P.O. Box 1738
Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands
+31-10-4082159 (Phone)
+31-10-4089161 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.few.eur.nl/dur

Tinbergen Institute

Amsterdam/Rotterdam
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Robin Zoutenbier

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
153
Abstract Views
966
Rank
198,964
PlumX Metrics