Popper's Fact-Standard Dualism Contra 'Value-Free' Social Science Karl R. Popper und die Philosophie des kritischen Rationalismus

Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 64, No. 1, pp. 1-18, March 1983 (English)

RODOPI VERLAG, pp. 157-176, Kurt Salamun, ed., 1988 (German)

18 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2011 Last revised: 5 Dec 2011

Fred Eidlin

Charles University

Date Written: 1983

Abstract

Non-cognitivism, the belief that normative statements, unlike empirical statements do NOT convey objective knowledge is deeply embedded in mainstream social science methodology and strongly influences the views of social scientists on the status of values in social science. This article contrasts to non-cognitivism the 'critical dualism' of Karl Popper. Critical dualism maintains that science is shot through with norms and normative judgments. Methodology, for example, consist of norms, and these cannot be derived from science without falling into the naturalist fallacy. Moreover, normative statements, although they cannot be shown to be true or false, may convey objective knowledge and may be improvable by rational methods continuous with those of science.

Keywords: fact-value, popper, fact-standard dualism, social science methodology, non-cognitivism, value cognitivism

Suggested Citation

Eidlin, Fred, Popper's Fact-Standard Dualism Contra 'Value-Free' Social Science Karl R. Popper und die Philosophie des kritischen Rationalismus (1983). Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 64, No. 1, pp. 1-18, March 1983 (English); RODOPI VERLAG, pp. 157-176, Kurt Salamun, ed., 1988 (German). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1965430

Fred Eidlin (Contact Author)

Charles University ( email )

U krize 8
Prague, 158 00
Czech Republic

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