Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Probabilistic Rules in Economies with One Public Good

30 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2011

See all articles by Shuhei Morimoto

Shuhei Morimoto

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Date Written: November 28, 2011

Abstract

We consider the problem of choosing a level of a public good on an interval of the real line among a group of agents. A probabilistic rule chooses a probability distribution over the interval for each preference profile. We investigate strategy-proof probabilistic rules in the case where distributions are compared based on stochastic dominance relations. First, on a "minimally rich domain", we characterize the so-called probabilistic generalized median rules (Ehlers et al., 2002, Journal of Economic Theory 105: 408-434) by means of stochastic-dominance (sd) strategy-proofness and ontoness. Next, we study how much we can enlarge a domain to allow for the existence of sd-strategyproof probabilistic rules that satisfy ontoness and the no-vetoer condition. We establish that the domain of "convex" preferences is the unique maximal domain including a minimally rich domain for these properties.

Keywords: public good, probabilistic rule, stochastic dominance relation, strategy-proofness, minimally rich domain, maximal domain

JEL Classification: D71

Suggested Citation

Morimoto, Shuhei, Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Probabilistic Rules in Economies with One Public Good (November 28, 2011). ISER Discussion Paper No. 823, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1965794 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1965794

Shuhei Morimoto (Contact Author)

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

6-1, Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka, 567-0047
Japan

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
11
Abstract Views
340
PlumX Metrics