Firm Heterogeneity, Informal Wage and Good Governance

28 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2011

See all articles by Sugata Marjit

Sugata Marjit

Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta; City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK) - Department of Economics & Finance

Saibal Kar

Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta; Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

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Date Written: November 29, 2011

Abstract

We provide an analysis of enforcement policies applicable to formal sector in dual labor markets. Using a framework with heterogeneous firms, endogenous determination of informal wage and politically dictated enforcement strategies, we show that firms which operate both in the formal and informal sectors do very little to increase employment when faced with the opportunity of hiring workers in the informal labor market. Thus enforcement of labor laws and other regulations should not have aggregate employment effects, particularly when workers are productively homogeneous. For firms operating exclusively in the informal sector, the outcome is different. Taxing the more productive seems to be the optimal strategy.

Keywords: Informal Labor, Wage, Labor Regulations, Enforcement

JEL Classification: J21, J31, J50

Suggested Citation

Marjit, Sugata and Kar, Saibal, Firm Heterogeneity, Informal Wage and Good Governance (November 29, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1966042 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1966042

Sugata Marjit (Contact Author)

Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta ( email )

R 1, B.P. Township
Kolkata, West Bengal, India
Kolkata, West Bengal 700094
India

City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK) - Department of Economics & Finance ( email )

83 Tat Chee Avenue
Kowloon
Hong Kong

Saibal Kar

Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta ( email )

R-1, Baishnabghata Patuli Township
Calcutta, 700 094
India
91-33-2462 7252 (Phone)
91-33-2462 6183 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cssscal.org

Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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