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Search Advertising

32 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 2011 Last revised: 19 Aug 2014

Alexandre de Corniere

Toulouse School of Economics

Date Written: June 18, 2013

Abstract

Search engines enable advertisers to target consumers based on the query they have entered. In a framework in which consumers search sequentially after having entered a query, I show that targeting reduces search costs, improves matches and intensifies price competition. However, a profit-maximizing search engine imposes a distortion by charging too high an advertising fee, which may negate the benefits of targeting. The search engine also has incentives to provide a suboptimal quality of sponsored links.
Competition among search engines can increase or decrease welfare, depending on the downstream market structure.

Keywords: search engine, targeted advertising, consumer search

JEL Classification: D43, D83, L13, M37

Suggested Citation

de Corniere, Alexandre, Search Advertising (June 18, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1967102 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1967102

Alexandre De Corniere (Contact Author)

Toulouse School of Economics ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

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