Buyer Alliances as Countervailing Power in WIC Infant-Formula Auctions

27 Pages Posted: 10 Dec 2011

See all articles by David E. Davis

David E. Davis

South Dakota State University - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 6, 2011

Abstract

State WIC agencies in infant-formula procurement auctions receive lower bids and final prices when they are in buyer’s alliances than when they are unallied. The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) uses an auction to procure infant formula. Manufacturers bid on the right to be an agency’s sole supplier by offering a rebate on formula sold through WIC. A theoretical model of rebates shows that bidders may shade their bids and extract surplus from agencies. Estimation shows that bids are lower to alliances suggesting that alliances countervail the power of bidders to extract surplus.

Keywords: auctions, food assistance, countervailing power, buyer concentration, oligopoly, WIC

JEL Classification: L13, D43, D44, Q18, I18

Suggested Citation

Davis, David E., Buyer Alliances as Countervailing Power in WIC Infant-Formula Auctions (December 6, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1969018 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1969018

David E. Davis (Contact Author)

South Dakota State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Brookings, SD 57007-0895
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sdstate.edu/econ/faculty/david-davis/index.cfm

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