Moral Rationalism and the Normative Status of Desiderative Coherence

Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol. 7, p. 227, 2010

35 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2011

See all articles by Patricia Marino

Patricia Marino

University of Waterloo - Department of Philosophy

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

This paper concerns the normative status of coherence of desires, in the context of moral rationalism. I argue that ‘desiderative coherence’ is not tied to rationality, but is rather of pragmatic, instrumental, and sometimes moral value. This means that desire-based views cannot rely on coherence to support non-agent-relative accounts of moral reasons. For example, on Michael Smith’s neo-rationalist view, you have ‘normative reason’ to do whatever your maximally coherent and fully informed self would want you to do, whether you want to do it or not. For these reasons to be non-agent-relative, coherence would have to be grounded in rationality, but I argue that it is not. I analyze, and reject, various strategies for establishing a coherence-rationality connection, considering in detail a purported analogy between desires and a priori beliefs, with particular attention to the case of mathematics.

Keywords: coherence, desire, moral rationalism, rationality, Michael Smith

Suggested Citation

Marino, Patricia, Moral Rationalism and the Normative Status of Desiderative Coherence (2010). Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol. 7, p. 227, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1969086

Patricia Marino (Contact Author)

University of Waterloo - Department of Philosophy ( email )

200 University Avenue West
Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1
Canada

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