What Should a Correspondence Theory Be and Do?

Philosophical Studies, Vol. 127, pp. 415-457, 2006

46 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2011

See all articles by Patricia Marino

Patricia Marino

University of Waterloo - Department of Philosophy

Date Written: 2006

Abstract

Correspondence theories are frequently either too vaguely expressed – ‘‘true statements correspond to the way things are in the world,’’ or implausible – ‘‘true statements mirror raw, mind-independent reality.’’ I address this problem by developing features and roles that ought to characterize what I call ‘‘modest’’ correspondence theories. Of special importance is the role of correspondence in directing our responses to cases of suspected non-factuality; lack of straightforward correspondence shows the need for, and guides us in our choice of, various kinds of reconstrual projects. This, I argue, is in contrast to the approaches suggested by deflationism and coherence, and thus modest correspondence theories are appropriately distinct from rivals.

Keywords: correspondence theory of truth, theories of truth

Suggested Citation

Marino, Patricia, What Should a Correspondence Theory Be and Do? (2006). Philosophical Studies, Vol. 127, pp. 415-457, 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1969092

Patricia Marino (Contact Author)

University of Waterloo - Department of Philosophy ( email )

200 University Avenue West
Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1
Canada

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