Citations (1)


Footnotes (44)



Expressivism, Deflationism, and Correspondence

Patricia Marino

University of Waterloo - Department of Philosophy

December 1, 2004

The Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 171, 2005

On an expressivist view, ethical claims are not fact stating; instead they serve the alternative function of expressing our feelings, attitudes and values. On a deflationary view, truth is not a property with a nature to be analyzed, but merely a grammatical device to aid us in endorsing sentences. Views on the relationship between expressivism and deflationism vary widely: they are compatible; they are incompatible; they are a natural pair; they doom one another. Here I explain some of these views, extract some necessary distinctions, and put these to use for understanding expressivism. I argue that contrary to the opinions of some, deflationism doesn't help with problems of objectivity, knowledge and reasoning in ethics. I suggest alternative expressivist treatments of these problems, and show how expressivism as a metaethical view must have consequences for our ethical lives and beliefs. In particular it must affect the way we deal with ethical consistency — when norms or beliefs conflict — and ethical incompleteness — when ethical questions have no right answer.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: truth, expressivism, deflationism, correspondence theory of truth

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: December 6, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Marino, Patricia, Expressivism, Deflationism, and Correspondence (December 1, 2004). The Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 171, 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1969093

Contact Information

Patricia Marino (Contact Author)
University of Waterloo - Department of Philosophy ( email )
200 University Avenue West
Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 249
Downloads: 30
Citations:  1
Footnotes:  44