Political Contestability and Public Contracting

Journal of Public Economic Theory (Forthcoming)

33 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2011 Last revised: 15 Jun 2018

See all articles by Marian W. Moszoro

Marian W. Moszoro

George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES); Warsaw School of Economics (SGH)

Pablo T. Spiller

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 5, 2018

Abstract

Do public agents undertake socially inefficient activities to protect themselves? In politically contestable markets, part of the lack of flexibility in the design and implementation of the public procurement process reflects public agents' risk adaptations to limit the political hazards from opportunistic third parties---political opponents, competitors, and interest groups. Reduced flexibility limits the likelihood of opportunistic challenges, while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. We study this matter and provide a comprehensive theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions.

Keywords: Transaction Costs, Bureaucracy, Procurement

JEL Classification: D23, D73, H57

Suggested Citation

Moszoro, Marian W. and Spiller, Pablo T., Political Contestability and Public Contracting (June 5, 2018). Journal of Public Economic Theory (Forthcoming). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1969105 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1969105

Marian W. Moszoro (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://economics.gmu.edu/people/mmoszoro

George Mason University - Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES) ( email )

400P Truland Building
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

Warsaw School of Economics (SGH) ( email )

aleja Niepodleglosci 162
PL-Warsaw, 02-554
Poland

Pablo T. Spiller

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group ( email )

545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-1502 (Phone)
510-642-2826 (Fax)

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