Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review Beyond the State: Normative Subsidiarity and Judicial Standards of Review

International Journal of Constitutional Law (I•CON ), Vol. 10, No. 4, Fall 2012

Jean Monnet Working Paper (NYU Law School) No. 10/11

28 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2011 Last revised: 24 Jul 2013

Date Written: November 21, 2011

Abstract

Judicial review of the acts of national governments by courts beyond the state raises the question of the democratic legitimacy of such review. In this paper, I outline a position that identifies the ideal of self-government as the core of democracy and argue that in order to be democratically legitimate, judicial review by international courts must be guided by the principle of “normative subsidiarity.” Normative subsidiarity recognizes the legitimate exercise of decision-making authority by national governments in specific contexts as an appropriate instantiation of self-government at that level and, as a result, requires international courts to exercise some deference through appropriately defined judicial standards of review. While a number of international courts have already adopted appropriately deferential standards, I argue that all courts and tribunals engaged in judicial review beyond the state need to address the demands of normative subsidiarity if they want to enhance their specifically democratic legitimacy.

JEL Classification: K33

Suggested Citation

von Staden, Andreas, Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review Beyond the State: Normative Subsidiarity and Judicial Standards of Review (November 21, 2011). International Journal of Constitutional Law (I•CON ), Vol. 10, No. 4, Fall 2012 ; Jean Monnet Working Paper (NYU Law School) No. 10/11 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1969442 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1969442

Andreas Von Staden (Contact Author)

Universität Hamburg ( email )

Department of Social Sciences
Allende-Platz 1
Hamburg, Hamburg 20148
Germany

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