Toward a Modest Correspondence Theory of Truth: Predicates and Properties

The Canadian Philosophical Review, Vol. 47, pp. 81-102, 2008

34 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2011

See all articles by Patricia Marino

Patricia Marino

University of Waterloo - Department of Philosophy

Date Written: December 7, 2011

Abstract

Correspondence theories are frequently charged with being either implausible — metaphysically troubling and overly general — or trivial — collapsing into deflationism "'P' is true iff P." Philip Kitcher argues for a "modest" correspondence theory, on which reference relations are causal relations, but there is no general theory of denotation. In this article, I start by showing that, understood this way, "modest" theories are open to charges of triviality. I then offer a refinement of modesty, and take the first steps toward articulating a modest correspondence theory, giving a particular account of the relation between predicates, properties, and extensions. Finally, I argue that my account does not collapse into a deflationary one.

Keywords: deflationism, theories of truth, correspondence theory of truth, Philip Kitcher, naturalism

Suggested Citation

Marino, Patricia, Toward a Modest Correspondence Theory of Truth: Predicates and Properties (December 7, 2011). The Canadian Philosophical Review, Vol. 47, pp. 81-102, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1969455

Patricia Marino (Contact Author)

University of Waterloo - Department of Philosophy ( email )

200 University Avenue West
Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1
Canada

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