Toward a Modest Correspondence Theory of Truth: Predicates and Properties
The Canadian Philosophical Review, Vol. 47, pp. 81-102, 2008
34 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2011
Date Written: December 7, 2011
Correspondence theories are frequently charged with being either implausible — metaphysically troubling and overly general — or trivial — collapsing into deflationism "'P' is true iff P." Philip Kitcher argues for a "modest" correspondence theory, on which reference relations are causal relations, but there is no general theory of denotation. In this article, I start by showing that, understood this way, "modest" theories are open to charges of triviality. I then offer a refinement of modesty, and take the first steps toward articulating a modest correspondence theory, giving a particular account of the relation between predicates, properties, and extensions. Finally, I argue that my account does not collapse into a deflationary one.
Keywords: deflationism, theories of truth, correspondence theory of truth, Philip Kitcher, naturalism
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation