Stock Repurchases in Canada: Performance and Strategic Trading

37 Pages Posted: 11 Feb 2000 Last revised: 9 Jul 2022

See all articles by David L. Ikenberry

David L. Ikenberry

Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado Boulder

Josef Lakonishok

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Theo Vermaelen

INSEAD - Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: August 1999

Abstract

During the 1980s, U.S. firms that announced stock repurchase programs earned favorable long-run returns. Recently, concerns have been raised regarding the robustness of these findings. This comes at a time of explosive worldwide growth in the adoption of repurchase programs. This study provides out-of-sample evidence for 1,060 Canadian repurchase programs announced between 1989 and 1997. As in the U.S., the Canadian stock market seems to discount the information contained in repurchase announcements. Value stocks announcing repurchase programs have particularly favorable returns. Canadian law requires companies to report how many shares they repurchase on a monthly basis. We find that managers are sensitive to mispricing as completion rates are higher in cases where undervaluation may be a more important factor. Moreover, trades are linked to price movements; managers buy more shares when prices fall and reduce their buying when prices rise.

Suggested Citation

Ikenberry, David L. and Lakonishok, Josef and Vermaelen, Theo, Stock Repurchases in Canada: Performance and Strategic Trading (August 1999). NBER Working Paper No. w7325, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=197071

David L. Ikenberry (Contact Author)

Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado Boulder ( email )

Boulder, CO 80309-0419
United States
303-492-1809 (Phone)

Josef Lakonishok

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )

1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
217-333-7185 (Phone)
217-244-3102 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Theo Vermaelen

INSEAD - Finance ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France
33 1 60 72 42 63 (Phone)
33 1 60 72 40 45 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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