Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

50 Pages Posted: 15 Dec 2011

See all articles by Dirk Bergemann

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Stephen Morris

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 12, 2011

Abstract

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with quadratic payoffs and normally distributed uncertainty in terms of restrictions on the first and second moments of the equilibrium action-state distribution. We derive exact bounds on how prior knowledge about the private information refines the set of equilibrium predictions.

We consider information sharing among firms under demand uncertainty and find newly optimal information policies via the Bayes correlated equilibria. Finally, we reverse the perspective and investigate the identification problem under concerns for robustness to private information. The presence of private information leads to set rather than point identification of the structural parameters of the game.

Keywords: Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds

JEL Classification: C72, C73, D43, D83

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Morris, Stephen Edward, Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (December 12, 2011). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821R. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1971201 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1971201

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-3592 (Phone)
203-432-2128 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Stephen Edward Morris

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
52
rank
41,841
Abstract Views
593
PlumX Metrics
!

Under construction: SSRN citations while be offline until July when we will launch a brand new and improved citations service, check here for more details.

For more information