Download This PaperThe Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation
40 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2011
Date Written: December 12, 2011
Abstract
This paper examines the law and economics of third-party financed litigation. I explore the conditions under which a system of third-party financiers and litigators can enhance social welfare, and the conditions under which it is likely to reduce social welfare. Among the applications I consider are the sale of legal rights (such as contingent tort claims) to insurers, to patent trolls, and to financiers generally.
Keywords: third-party financed litigation, barretry, torts, litigation and procedure, champerty, private incentive to litigation, social incentive to litigate, economics of litigation, maintenance, subrogation, patent trolls
JEL Classification: K00, K13, K19, K39, K40, K41, K49
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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