The Joint Benefits of Observed and Unobserved Punishment: Comment to Unobserved Punishment Supports Cooperation

22 Pages Posted: 15 Dec 2011

See all articles by Andreas Glöckner

Andreas Glöckner

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Cologne

Sebastian Kube

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Bonn

Andreas Nicklisch

University of Hamburg - School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences; Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Date Written: November 18, 2011

Abstract

Laboratory experiments by Fudenberg and Pathak (2010), and Vyrastekova, Funaki and Takeuch (2008) show that punishment is able to sustain cooperation in groups even when it is observed only in the end of the interaction sequence. Our results demonstrate that the real power of unobserved punishment is unleashed when combined with observable punishment. Providing both unobserved and observed punishment strongly enhances cooperation within groups – strikingly, even with less intense sanctioning. This surprising result underlines the importance of the coexistence of observed and unobserved sanctioning mechanisms in social dilemmas.

Keywords: Public Goods, Unobserved Punishment, Sanctioning Effectiveness

JEL Classification: H41, C92, H40

Suggested Citation

Glöckner, Andreas and Kube, Sebastian and Nicklisch, Andreas, The Joint Benefits of Observed and Unobserved Punishment: Comment to Unobserved Punishment Supports Cooperation (November 18, 2011). MPI Collective Goods Preprint No. 2011/30. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1972222 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1972222

Andreas Glöckner

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de/team/page/andreas_gloeckner

University of Cologne ( email )

Richard-Strauss-Str. 2
Köln, 50931
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://soccco.uni-koeln.de/andreas-gloeckner.html

Sebastian Kube

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

University of Bonn

BWL 1
Adenauerallee 24-42
Bonn, D-53012
Germany

Andreas Nicklisch (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg - School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences ( email )

Von-Melle-Park 5
Hamburg, D-20354
Germany

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany
49 228 9141679 (Phone)
49 228 9141655 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de/nicklisch.html

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