Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

A Bundle Theorist Holds On to His Collection of Sticks

Econ Journal Watch, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 265-73, September 2011

UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 11-36

9 Pages Posted: 15 Dec 2011  

Stephen R. Munzer

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

Date Written: September 14, 2011

Abstract

For nearly a century, most persons who have studied or written about property have conceived of it as a bundle of rights or, colloquially, as a bundle of sticks. In the mid 1990s, several philosophically minded academic lawyers questioned whether property should be thought of as a bundle at all. The impact of their work is reflected in Merrill and Smith (2007), a highly regarded and intellectually challenging casebook used in many U.S. law schools. Merrill and Smith emphasize that property is centrally a right to exclude and is generally held in rem, that is, is good against all the world. They find bundle theories of property defective for various reasons. This essay argues to the contrary. There are solid grounds for holding on to at least some bundle theories, which facilitate the careful analysis of the complexity of property. Moreover, Merrill and Smith’s criticisms are often misguided or ineffective. Lastly, their account gives an overly simple picture of property and views property law as a more unified subject than it actually is.

Keywords: property, bundle of rights, exclusion, rights, legal realism, Hohfeld, Honore, philosophy of law

JEL Classification: A1, K00, K1

Suggested Citation

Munzer, Stephen R., A Bundle Theorist Holds On to His Collection of Sticks (September 14, 2011). Econ Journal Watch, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 265-73, September 2011; UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 11-36. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1972364

Stephen R. Munzer (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )

385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
(310) 825-1332 (Phone)
(310) 206-7010 (Fax)

Paper statistics

Downloads
259
Rank
99,131
Abstract Views
1,141