The Constitutional Dilemma of European Integration
19 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2011
Date Written: 1998
Abstract
The paper analyzes European integration from a constitutional economics perspective. It is argued that the use of the Prisoners' Dilemma as a description of the advantages of European integration is fallacious. If the situation is a PD, the solution is impossible; if it is not, it is unnecessary.
Keywords: prisoners dilemma, constitutions, constitutional economics, public choice, European Union
JEL Classification: D70, D72, D62
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, The Constitutional Dilemma of European Integration (1998). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1973504 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1973504
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