Siesta: A Theory of Freelancing
University of Zurich Department of Economics Working Paper No. 55
20 Pages Posted: 17 Dec 2011
Date Written: December 1, 2011
Abstract
I study the effect of fatigue and innate ability on performance in a model with incomplete contracts, lumpy tasks requiring multiple periods of work and stochastic productivity shocks. I find that increasing ability or reducing fatigue does not lead necessarily to more productive efficiency, since it may exacerbate the incentive for agents take "too much" on-the-job leisure. In a world with heterogeneous agents, the problem may be ameliorated by the introduction of a dual labor market with free-lancers (who can take breaks at their discretion) and regular workers (who work on a fixed schedule).
Keywords: Breaks, leisure, productivity, freelancing
JEL Classification: D0, D8, D9, M51, M55
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation