37 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2011
Date Written: December 2011
We propose a model of two‐tier competition between vertically integrated firms and unintegrated downstream firms. We show that, even when integrated firms compete in prices to offer a homogeneous input, the Bertrand logic may collapse, and the input may be priced above marginal cost in equilibrium. These partial foreclosure equilibria are more likely to exist when downstream competition is fierce or when unintegrated downstream competitors are relatively inefficient. We discuss the impact of several regulatory tools on the competitiveness of the wholesale market.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bourreau, Marc, Upstream Competition between Vertically Integrated Firms (December 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1974820 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2011.00469.x
This is a Wiley-Blackwell Publishing paper. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing charges $38.00 .
File name: joie469.
If you wish to purchase the right to make copies of this paper for distribution to others, please select the quantity.