Academic Faculty Governance and Recruitment Decisions

23 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2011

See all articles by Jens Prufer

Jens Prufer

Tilburg University - CentER; Tilburg University - Department of Economics; Tilburg University - Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Uwe Walz

Goethe University Frankfurt - Institute of Economics; Center For Financial Studies (CFS); Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

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Date Written: September 14, 2011

Abstract

We analyze the implications of the governance structure in academic faculties for their recruitment decisions when competing for new researchers. The value to individual members through social interaction within the faculty depends on the average status of their fellow members. In recruitment decisions, incumbent members trade off the effect of entry on average faculty status against alternative uses of the recruitment budget if no entry takes place. We show that the best candidates join the best faculties but that they receive lower wages than some lesser ranking candidates. We also study the allocation of surplus created by the entry of a new faculty member and show that faculties with symmetric status distributions maximize their joint surplus under majority voting.

Keywords: Academic faculties, university governance, status organizations, labor market competition

JEL Classification: D02, D71, L22

Suggested Citation

Prufer, Jens and Walz, Uwe, Academic Faculty Governance and Recruitment Decisions (September 14, 2011). Public Choice, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1974930

Jens Prufer (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - CentER ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC Noord-Brabant 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Uwe Walz

Goethe University Frankfurt - Institute of Economics ( email )

Postfach 81
D-60054 Frankfurt
Germany

Center For Financial Studies (CFS) ( email )

Gr├╝neburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE ( email )

(http://www.safe-frankfurt.de)
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

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