Surviving Elections: Election Violence, Incumbent Victory, and Post-Election Repercussions

57 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2011 Last revised: 24 Sep 2015

See all articles by Emilie Marie Hafner-Burton

Emilie Marie Hafner-Burton

UCSD School of Global Policy and Strategy

Susan D. Hyde

University of California, Berkeley

Ryan S. Jablonski

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Government

Date Written: August 10, 2015

Abstract

This article examines how government-sponsored election violence influences the ability of incumbent leaders to win elections and remain in power. We argue that election violence is a costly tradeoff for governments. When used in the pre-election period, up to and including election day, government-sponsored election violence against opposition supporters, candidates, and the citizenry increases the probability that opposition political parties boycott the election and the incumbent wins. Yet pre-election violence also increases the probability of mass post-election protests by the opposition, which in turn raise the odds that the incumbent will be forced to make political concessions in the post-election period by stepping down or holding new elections. Violence against protesters does not change these odds.

Keywords: election violence, election protest, election manipulation, electoral revolution, leader tenure

Suggested Citation

Hafner-Burton, Emilie Marie and Hyde, Susan D. and Jablonski, Ryan S., Surviving Elections: Election Violence, Incumbent Victory, and Post-Election Repercussions (August 10, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1975026 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1975026

Emilie Marie Hafner-Burton

UCSD School of Global Policy and Strategy ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093-0519
United States

HOME PAGE: http://gps.ucsd.edu/ehafner/

Susan D. Hyde (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
5106424533 (Phone)

Ryan S. Jablonski

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Government ( email )

London
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://ryanjablonski.wordpress.com

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