Does the Tail Wag the Dog? The Effect of Credit Default Swaps on Credit Risk

67 Pages Posted: 24 Dec 2011 Last revised: 24 Feb 2012

See all articles by Marti G. Subrahmanyam

Marti G. Subrahmanyam

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; NYU Shanghai

Dragon Yongjun Tang

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics

Sarah Qian Wang

University of Warwick - Warwick Business School

Date Written: February 16, 2012

Abstract

Concerns have been raised, especially since the global financial crisis, about whether trading in credit default swaps (CDS) increases the credit risk of the reference entities. We use a unique, comprehensive sample covering 901 CDS introductions on North American corporate issuers between June 1997 and April 2009 to address this question. We present evidence that the probability of credit rating downgrade and the probability of bankruptcy both increase after the inception of CDS trading. The effect is robust to controlling for the endogeneity of CDS introduction, i.e., the possibility that firms with upcoming deterioration in creditworthiness are more likely to be selected for CDS trading. We show that the CDS-protected lenders' reluctance to restructure is the most likely cause of the increase in credit risk. We present evidence that firms with relatively larger amounts of CDS contracts outstanding, and those with more "No Restructuring" contracts, are more likely to be adversely affected by CDS trading. We also document that CDS trading increases the level of participation of bank lenders to the firm. Our findings are broadly consistent with the predictions of the "empty creditor" model of Bolton and Oehmke (2011).

Keywords: Credit default swap, bankruptcy risk, empty creditor, restructuring

JEL Classification: G10, G12, G33

Suggested Citation

Subrahmanyam, Marti G. and Tang, Dragon Yongjun and Wang, Sarah Qian, Does the Tail Wag the Dog? The Effect of Credit Default Swaps on Credit Risk (February 16, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1976084 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1976084

Marti G. Subrahmanyam

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

NYU Shanghai ( email )

1555 Century Ave
Shanghai, 200122
China

Dragon Yongjun Tang

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )

KKL 1004
Pokfulam Road
Pokfulam
Hong Kong
(852)22194321 (Phone)

Sarah Qian Wang (Contact Author)

University of Warwick - Warwick Business School ( email )

Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

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