Enhancing Welfare by Attacking Anticompetitive Market Distortions

Concurrences, No. 4, 2011

6 Pages Posted: 1 Jan 2012

See all articles by Alden F. Abbott

Alden F. Abbott

George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Shanker A. Singham

Steel Hector & Davis LLP

Date Written: December 1, 2011


“Anticompetitive market distortions,” or “ACMDs,” involve government actions that empower certain private interests to obtain or retain artificial competitive advantages over their rivals be they foreign or domestic, to the detriment of consumer welfare. This article assesses the nature of ACMDs, and the problems governmental and international institutions (in particular, the World Trade Organization and national competition agencies) have had in dealing with them. We suggest that the multilateral International Competition Network – and, in particular, the ICN’s Advocacy Working Group – may be a possible near term vehicle for beginning to confront, or at least beginning to highlight, the harm of ACMDs. With that in mind, this article proposed the development of a metric to estimate the net welfare costs of ACMDs. Such a metric could help strengthen the hand of the ICN – and of reform-minded public officials.

Keywords: Anticompetitive market distortions, Government actions, Private interests, Artificial competitive advantages, Consumer Welfare, Governmental international institutions, Multilateral International Competition Network

Suggested Citation

Abbott, Alden F. and Singham, Shanker A., Enhancing Welfare by Attacking Anticompetitive Market Distortions (December 1, 2011). Concurrences, No. 4, 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1977517

Alden F. Abbott (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Shanker A. Singham

Steel Hector & Davis LLP ( email )

200 South Biscayne Boulevard
41st Floor
Miami, FL 33131-2398
United States

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