Transnational Trafficking, Law Enforcement and Victim Protection: A Middleman Trafficker's Perspective

47 Pages Posted: 31 Dec 2011

See all articles by Randall Akee

Randall Akee

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Arjun S. Bedi

Erasmus University Rotterdam - International Institute of Social Studies; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Arnab K. Basu

College of William and Mary - Department of Economics

Nancy H. Chau

Cornell University - School of Applied Economics and Management; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

We explore three hitherto poorly understood characteristics of the human trafficking market – the cross-border ease of mobility of traffickers, the relative bargaining strength of traffickers and final buyers, and the elasticity of buyers' demand. In a model of two-way bargaining, the exact configuration of these characteristics is shown to determine whether domestic and foreign crackdowns on illicit employment mutually reinforce or counteract one another in efforts to stem the tide of trafficking. Estimation results from a gravity model of trafficking present evidence consistent with the mutual reinforcement view, indicating considerable ease of mobility, partial bargaining power, and inelastic demand.

Keywords: human trafficking, two-way Nash bargaining, victim protection, law enforcement

JEL Classification: K42, R23, O15

Suggested Citation

Akee, Randall and Bedi, Arjun S. and Basu, Arnab K. and Chau, Nancy H., Transnational Trafficking, Law Enforcement and Victim Protection: A Middleman Trafficker's Perspective. IZA Discussion Paper No. 6226. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1977812

Randall Akee (Contact Author)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Arjun S. Bedi

Erasmus University Rotterdam - International Institute of Social Studies ( email )

PO Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague, 2518 AX
Netherlands
+31 70 426 0493 (Phone)
+31 70 426 0799 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Arnab K. Basu

College of William and Mary - Department of Economics ( email )

Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795
United States
757-221-1318 (Phone)
757-221-1175 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.wm.edu/akbasu/

Nancy H. Chau

Cornell University - School of Applied Economics and Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-4463 (Phone)
607-255-9984 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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