Private and Public Approaches to Patent Holdup in Industry Standard-Setting

40 Pages Posted: 2 Jan 2012

See all articles by Timothy Simcoe

Timothy Simcoe

Boston University - Questrom School of Business; NBER

Date Written: December 8, 2011

Abstract

Many standard setting organizations (SSOs) promote coordinated industry-wide investments in technologies that may be patented. If these investments are sunk before implementers become aware of the patents, or obtain some assurance of a reasonably priced license, the patentee will have a very strong bargaining position. The resulting holdup problem may lead to higher prices and reluctance to implement new standards. This article describes steps that many SSOs take (or might take) to mitigate patent holdup, and discusses public policies that can strengthen or weaken the private initiatives of SSOs to deal with the problem of potential holdup.

Keywords: Standards, patents, intellectual property, FRAND, licensing, holdup

JEL Classification: L15, O34, D71, D72

Suggested Citation

Simcoe, Timothy S., Private and Public Approaches to Patent Holdup in Industry Standard-Setting (December 8, 2011). Antitrust Bulliten, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1978412

Timothy S. Simcoe (Contact Author)

Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA MA 02215
United States

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
72
Abstract Views
407
Rank
273,015
PlumX Metrics