Institutional Transition and the Problem of Credible Commitment

THE ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE WEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF NATIONS, p. 41, Emily Chamlee-Wright, ed., Beloit College Press, 2011

11 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2012 Last revised: 24 Feb 2012

See all articles by Peter J. Boettke

Peter J. Boettke

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

This paper explores the problem of credible commitment that public officials face with regard to institutional reform. Doug North points out that while economies grow as a result of the provision of governance, I argue that creating an entity with a geographic monopoly simultaneously limits the problem of private predation while creating the problem of public predation. In societies where predation is common, tying the rulers hands proves to be a difficult task.

Keywords: Institutions, Constitutional Political Economy, Douglass North

JEL Classification: B25, B52, B53, D02, O17

Suggested Citation

Boettke, Peter J., Institutional Transition and the Problem of Credible Commitment (2011). THE ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE WEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF NATIONS, p. 41, Emily Chamlee-Wright, ed., Beloit College Press, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1978639

Peter J. Boettke (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-1149 (Phone)
703-993-1133 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
87
Abstract Views
654
rank
169,305
PlumX Metrics