Institutional Transition and the Problem of Credible Commitment
THE ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE WEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF NATIONS, p. 41, Emily Chamlee-Wright, ed., Beloit College Press, 2011
11 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2012 Last revised: 24 Feb 2012
Date Written: 2011
This paper explores the problem of credible commitment that public officials face with regard to institutional reform. Doug North points out that while economies grow as a result of the provision of governance, I argue that creating an entity with a geographic monopoly simultaneously limits the problem of private predation while creating the problem of public predation. In societies where predation is common, tying the rulers hands proves to be a difficult task.
Keywords: Institutions, Constitutional Political Economy, Douglass North
JEL Classification: B25, B52, B53, D02, O17
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation