Institutional Transition and the Problem of Credible Commitment

Boettke, Peter J.

Institutional Transition and the Problem of Credible Commitment

THE ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE WEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF NATIONS, p. 41, Emily Chamlee-Wright, ed., Beloit College Press, 2011

11 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2012 Last revised: 24 Feb 2012

See all articles by Peter J. Boettke

Peter J. Boettke

George Mason University - Department of Economics; Mercatus Center at George Mason University

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

This paper explores the problem of credible commitment that public officials face with regard to institutional reform. Doug North points out that while economies grow as a result of the provision of governance, I argue that creating an entity with a geographic monopoly simultaneously limits the problem of private predation while creating the problem of public predation. In societies where predation is common, tying the rulers hands proves to be a difficult task.

Keywords: Institutions, Constitutional Political Economy, Douglass North

JEL Classification: B25, B52, B53, D02, O17

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Boettke, Peter J. and Boettke, Peter J., Institutional Transition and the Problem of Credible Commitment (2011). THE ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE WEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF NATIONS, p. 41, Emily Chamlee-Wright, ed., Beloit College Press, 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1978639