Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders

Texas Review of Law and Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2, p. 239, 2007

44 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2012

See all articles by Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

Independence & Montana Policy Institutes

Date Written: 2007

Abstract

The U.S. Constitution's General Welfare Clause was intended to be fiduciary-style restriction on the purposes for which the federal government could tax. This article summarizes Founding-Era fiduciary law. It then suggests how modern courts could apply that law to enforce, at least to some extent, the requirements of the General Welfare Clause by voiding the least justifiable forms of congressional "porkbarrel" spending.

Keywords: constitution, federal spending, federal expenditures, porkbarrel spending, General Welfare Clause, fiduciary law, 18th century law, original understanding, original intent, original meaning, federal deficit

JEL Classification: K1, K10, K19

Suggested Citation

Natelson, Robert G., Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders (2007). Texas Review of Law and Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2, p. 239, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1979017

Robert G. Natelson (Contact Author)

Independence & Montana Policy Institutes ( email )

727 E. 16th Ave.
Denver, CO 80203
United States
303-279-6536 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://robnatelson.com

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