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Contracting Employee Involvement: An Analysis of Bargaining Over Employee Involvement Rules for a Societas Europaea

42 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2012 Last revised: 30 Jan 2012

Horst Eidenmueller

University of Oxford; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Lars Hornuf

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics; Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Markus Reps

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich

Date Written: January 4, 2012

Abstract

Following a slow start, the European Company (Societas Europaea – SE) has become a popular legal form amongst European firms. It is rendered attractive by corporate governance features such as the contractual freedom of capital and labor to design a firm-specific employee involvement regime. By analyzing what has been settled for in such agreements, we investigate whether national mandatory employee involvement rules are efficient and which factors impede firm-specific bargained-for solutions.

Keywords: European Company, Societas Europaea, employee involvement, contractual negotiations, contract governance

JEL Classification: J5, D23, K31

Suggested Citation

Eidenmueller, Horst and Hornuf, Lars and Reps, Markus, Contracting Employee Involvement: An Analysis of Bargaining Over Employee Involvement Rules for a Societas Europaea (January 4, 2012). ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 185/2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1979487 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1979487

Horst G. M. Eidenmueller (Contact Author)

University of Oxford ( email )

Mansfield Road
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 4AU
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Lars Hornuf

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics ( email )

Bremen, D-28359
Germany
+49 89 20348619 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.hornuf.com

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

Markus Reps

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich ( email )

Institute of International Law
Veterinärstr. 5
Munich, 80539
Germany
+49 89 2180 2109 (Phone)

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