Divorcing Power and Reason: Spinoza and the Founding of Modern Law

23 Pages Posted: 6 Jan 2012

See all articles by Benoit Frydman

Benoit Frydman

Perelman Centre for Legal Philosophy; Sciences Po School of Law

Date Written: January 5, 2012

Abstract

This paper explains how Spinoza contributed to turning our conception of the law and the methods of its interpretation upside down. His contribution has been essential and twofold: (1) Spinoza was partly responsible for the destruction of the “legal model of thought” (ratio more juridico), which prevailed until the 16th century (and sometimes later) not only in legal matters but in most areas of scientific knowledge; (2) Spinoza also played a major role in the shaping of modern law, which rests upon the summa divisio between, on one hand, natural law, embedded in natural reason and discovered more geometrico, and, on the other hand, positive law, which expresses the will of the sovereign power and rests upon its sole authority. This division, I will argue, is neither eternal nor self-evident, but an effect of the strategy followed by Spinoza and a few others in their arduous struggle against traditional powers and religious authorities.

Keywords: Natural Law, Spinoza, Hobbes, Legal Philosophy, Jurisprudence, Hermeneutics, History of Ideas

Suggested Citation

Frydman, Benoit, Divorcing Power and Reason: Spinoza and the Founding of Modern Law (January 5, 2012). Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 25, 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1980187

Benoit Frydman (Contact Author)

Perelman Centre for Legal Philosophy ( email )

CP 132 Av FD Roosevelt 50
Brussels, Brussels 1050
Belgium

Sciences Po School of Law ( email )

27 rue Saint-Guillaume
Paris Cedex 07, 75337
France

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