Land Use Controls and the Provision of Education

30 Pages Posted: 6 Jan 2012 Last revised: 9 Jan 2012

See all articles by Eric A. Hanushek

Eric A. Hanushek

Stanford University - Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Kuzey Yilmaz

Koc University - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 2012

Abstract

Considerable prior analysis has gone into the study of zoning restrictions on locational choice and on fiscal burdens. The prior work on zoning - particularly fiscal or exclusionary zoning - has provided both inconclusive theoretical results and quite inconsistent empirical support of the theory. More importantly, none of this work addresses important questions about the level and distribution of public goods that are provided under fiscal zoning. Since fiscal issues and Tiebout demands are central to much of the motivation for exclusionary zoning, we expand the theoretical analysis to encompass the interplay between land use restrictions and public good provision. In this, we focus on schooling outcomes, since the provision of education is one of the primary activities of local jurisdictions. We develop a general equilibrium model of location and the provision of education. Some households create a fiscal burden, motivating the use by local governments of exclusionary land-use controls. Then, the paper analyzes what the market effects of land-use controls are and how successful they are. The policies considered (minimum lot size zoning, local public finance with a head tax, and fringe zoning) demonstrate how household behavior directly affects the equilibrium outcomes and the provision of the local public good.

Suggested Citation

Hanushek, Eric A. and Yilmaz, Kuzey, Land Use Controls and the Provision of Education (January 2012). NBER Working Paper No. w17730. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1980580

Eric A. Hanushek (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
650-736-0942 (Phone)
650-723-1687 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Kuzey Yilmaz

Koc University - Department of Economics ( email )

Rumeli Feneri Yolu
Sariyer 80910, Istanbul
Turkey

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