ACTA and Access to Medicines

The Greens, European Free Alliance, 2011

American University, WCL Research Paper No. 2012-03

42 Pages Posted: 9 Jan 2012

See all articles by Sean Flynn

Sean Flynn

American University - Washington College of Law; Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property

Bijan Madhani

Independent

Date Written: October 6, 2011

Abstract

The Greens/EFA Internet Core Group in the European Parliament, and a collection of its individual members, commissioned this analysis of potential impacts of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) on access to medicines in developing countries.” On the whole, ACTA negotiators created an agreement that shifts international “hard law” rules and “soft law” encouragements toward making enforcement of intellectual property rights in courts, at borders, by the government and by private parties easier, less costly, and more “deterrent” in the level of penalties. In doing so, it increases the risks and consequences of wrongful searches, seizures, lawsuits and other enforcement actions for those relying on intellectual property limitations and exceptions to access markets, including the suppliers of legitimate generic medicines. This, in turn, is likely to make affordable medicines more scarce and dear in many countries.

Keywords: Intellectual property, ACTA, generic medicines

Suggested Citation

Flynn, Sean and Madhani, Bijan, ACTA and Access to Medicines (October 6, 2011). The Greens, European Free Alliance, 2011 , American University, WCL Research Paper No. 2012-03, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1980865

Sean Flynn (Contact Author)

American University - Washington College of Law ( email )

4300 Nebraska Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016
United States

Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property

4300 Nebraska Avenue N.W.
Washington, DC 20016
United States

Bijan Madhani

Independent ( email )

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