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On Hatred

25 Pages Posted: 13 Jan 2012 Last revised: 9 Oct 2012

Tilman Klumpp

University of Alberta, Department of Economics

Hugo M. Mialon

Emory University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 3, 2012

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of hatred in two-player games. We model hate as “reverse-altruism” or a preference for low opponent payoffs, and derive implications for behavior in conflicts where players are motivated by hate. We use these results to illuminate several policy issues, both historical and contemporary: the strategy of non-violent resistance during the American civil rights era, shifts in U.S. national security strategy following 9/11, and the justification for criminal and civil penalty enhancements for hate crimes.

Keywords: Hate, conflict, (non)violence, (counter)terrorism, hate crime

JEL Classification: D74, H11, K14, K42

Suggested Citation

Klumpp, Tilman and Mialon, Hugo M., On Hatred (July 3, 2012). Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-120; Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 11-183. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1982145 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1982145

Tilman Klumpp

University of Alberta, Department of Economics ( email )

Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R3
Canada

Hugo M. Mialon (Contact Author)

Emory University - Department of Economics ( email )

1602 Fishburne Drive
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

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