Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe's Fiscal Union

24 Pages Posted: 10 Jan 2012  

C. Randall Henning

Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics

Martin Kessler

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: January 10, 2012

Abstract

European debates over reform of the fiscal governance of the euro area frequently reference fiscal federalism in the United States. The "fiscal compact" agreed by the European Council during 2011 provided for the introduction of, among other things, constitutional rules or framework laws known as "debt brakes" in the member states of the euro area. In light of the compact and proposals for deeper fiscal union, we review US fiscal federalism from Alexander Hamilton to the present. We note that within the US system the states are "sovereign." The federal government does not mandate balanced budgets nor, since the 1840s, does it bail out states in fiscal trouble. States adopted balanced budget rules of varying strength during the nineteenth century and these rules limit debt accumulation. Before introducing debt brakes for euro area member states, however, Europeans should consider three important caveats. First, debt brakes are likely to be more durable and effective when "owned" locally rather than mandated centrally. Second, maintaining a capacity for countercyclical macroeconomic stabilization is essential. Balanced budget rules have been viable in the US states because the federal government has a broad set of fiscal powers, including countercyclical fiscal action. Finally, because debt brakes threaten to collide with bank rescues, the euro area should unify bank regulation and create a common fiscal pool for restructuring the banking system.

Keywords: fiscal federalism, balanced budget rules, US financial history, state debt, euro crisis, fiscal compact

JEL Classification: H77, F33, N41, N42

Suggested Citation

Henning, C. Randall and Kessler, Martin, Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe's Fiscal Union (January 10, 2012). Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No. 2012-1. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1982709 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1982709

C. Randall Henning (Contact Author)

Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics ( email )

1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Martin Kessler

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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