66 Pages Posted: 12 Jan 2012 Last revised: 14 Apr 2012
Date Written: January 11, 2012
This Article explains that what has been missing from the debate between advocates of popular constitutionalism and defenders of judicial supremacy is any account of the practice of constitutional interpretation. Without a clear sense of what constitutional interpretation involves, we cannot assess the prevailing assumption that the Supreme Court is uniquely positioned to interpret the Constitution or explore an expertise-based justification for its claim to finality. The Article, therefore, revisits the debate about judicial supremacy by starting, not with history or politics, but with constitutional interpretation itself.
Having explored the practice of constitutional interpretation, it concludes that the Supreme Court can claim expertise with respect to determining constitutional meaning, but that its expertise has limits. The Article proceeds to explore whether and how this insight might be translated into limits to judicial supremacy. Toward that end, it develops a framework for assessing when the work of constitutional interpretation should be shared between the Supreme Court, the other branches of government, and the public itself. Finally, it uses the Court’s doctrine with respect to race-conscious legislative districting to illustrate how the proposed framework might work.
Keywords: Judicial supremacy, Popular Constitutionalism, Voting Rights, Voting Rights Act, Constitutional Interpretation, Federalism, Redistricting
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Abu El-Haj, Tabatha, Linking the Questions: Judicial Supremacy as a Matter of Constitutional Interpretation (January 11, 2012). Washington University Law Review, Vol. 89, 2012; Drexel University Earle Mack School of Law Research Paper No. 2012-A-01. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1983263
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