Insurance Structure and Health Investment

16 Pages Posted: 12 Jan 2012 Last revised: 17 Sep 2012

Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos

Indiana University - Robert H. McKinney School of Law

Date Written: January 10, 2012

Abstract

The structure of health insurance does not compensate insurers for long-term investments in prevention, such as those against chronic disease. This paper explores the legal structure of chronic disease treatment by insurers, illustrates the failure of the associated incentives, and explores possible improvements and recommends that subsequent insurers (including Medicare) have an obligation to compensate the prior insurer for the averted expenses on diseases that were expected but did not occur.

Keywords: Health Insurance, Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, Medicare

JEL Classification: G22, G28, H51, H55, I18, K32

Suggested Citation

Georgakopoulos, Nicholas L., Insurance Structure and Health Investment (January 10, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1983509 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1983509

Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos (Contact Author)

Indiana University - Robert H. McKinney School of Law ( email )

530 West New York Street
Indianapolis, IN 46202
United States
317-274-1825 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.nicholasgeorgakopoulos.org

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