Effects of Exclusion on Social Preferences

Fischer, Sven; Guth, Werner

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1983967

Effects of Exclusion on Social Preferences

MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2011/34

28 Pages Posted: 13 Jan 2012

See all articles by Sven Fischer

Werner Guth

Max Planck Institute of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: December 1, 2011

Abstract

In three party ultimatum games the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the second responder is only insignificantly reciprocated by him. Overall, we find little evidence that intentional exclusion affects response behavior.

Keywords: experiment, social preferences, Exclusion, bargaining, ultimatum game

JEL Classification: C91, J52

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Fischer, Sven and Güth, Werner, Effects of Exclusion on Social Preferences (December 1, 2011). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2011/34. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1983967 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1983967