Effects of Exclusion on Social Preferences

28 Pages Posted: 13 Jan 2012

See all articles by Sven Fischer

Sven Fischer

University of Newcastle - Economics

Werner Guth

Max Planck Institute of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: December 1, 2011

Abstract

In three party ultimatum games the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the second responder is only insignificantly reciprocated by him. Overall, we find little evidence that intentional exclusion affects response behavior.

Keywords: experiment, social preferences, Exclusion, bargaining, ultimatum game

JEL Classification: C91, J52

Suggested Citation

Fischer, Sven and Güth, Werner, Effects of Exclusion on Social Preferences (December 1, 2011). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2011/34. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1983967 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1983967

Sven Fischer (Contact Author)

University of Newcastle - Economics ( email )

Newcastle-upon-Tyne NE1 7RU
United Kingdom

Werner Güth

Max Planck Institute of Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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