Many-to-Many Matching with Max-Min Preferences
8 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2012 Last revised: 19 Jan 2012
Date Written: January 17, 2012
Abstract
We consider the many-to-many two-sided matching problem under a stringent domain restriction on preferences called the max-min criterion. We show that, even under this restriction, there is no stable mechanism that is weakly Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, or monotonic (i.e. respects improvements) for agents on one side of the market. These results imply in particular that three of the main results of Baiou and Balinski (2000) are incorrect.
Keywords: many-to-many two-sided matching, stability, pareto efficiency, monotonicity, strategy-proofness, max-min preferences
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