Many-to-Many Matching with Max-Min Preferences

8 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2012 Last revised: 19 Jan 2012

See all articles by John William Hatfield

John William Hatfield

University of Texas at Austin

Fuhito Kojima

Harvard University - Department of Economics

Yusuke Narita

Yale University - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Date Written: January 17, 2012

Abstract

We consider the many-to-many two-sided matching problem under a stringent domain restriction on preferences called the max-min criterion. We show that, even under this restriction, there is no stable mechanism that is weakly Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, or monotonic (i.e. respects improvements) for agents on one side of the market. These results imply in particular that three of the main results of Baiou and Balinski (2000) are incorrect.

Keywords: many-to-many two-sided matching, stability, pareto efficiency, monotonicity, strategy-proofness, max-min preferences

Suggested Citation

Hatfield, John William and Kojima, Fuhito and Narita, Yusuke, Many-to-Many Matching with Max-Min Preferences (January 17, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1986748 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1986748

John William Hatfield

University of Texas at Austin ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

Fuhito Kojima

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Yusuke Narita (Contact Author)

Yale University - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States

Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

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