Pro-Sociality and Strategic Reasoning in Economic Decisions

Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 2015, 9, 140

7 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2012 Last revised: 22 Jul 2018

See all articles by Benito Arruñada

Benito Arruñada

Pompeu Fabra University - Department of Economics and Business; Barcelona GSE

Marco Casari

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Francesca Pancotto

Department of Communication and Economics; Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna di Pisa - Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM); University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 16, 2012

Abstract

We study the relationship between pro-social preferences and strategic reasoning. These aspects are typically studied separately but little is known about their joint distribution. In an experiment, for each participant we elicit individual concerns toward pro-sociality — inequality aversion and efficiency — as well as the number of steps of reasoning through a guessing game. We report that self-regarding and pro-social participants exhibit similar levels of strategic reasoning, which supports the view that pro-sociality and strategic reasoning can be studied independently.

Keywords: guessing game, other-regarding preferences, strategic thinking

JEL Classification: C91, C92, D63

Suggested Citation

Arruñada, Benito and Casari, Marco and Pancotto, Francesca, Pro-Sociality and Strategic Reasoning in Economic Decisions (January 16, 2012). Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 2015, 9, 140. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1987556 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1987556

Benito Arruñada (Contact Author)

Pompeu Fabra University - Department of Economics and Business ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Department of Economics and Business
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34 93 542 25 72 (Phone)
+34 93 542 17 46 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upf.edu/~arrunada

Barcelona GSE ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Marco Casari

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

Francesca Pancotto

Department of Communication and Economics ( email )

Viale Allegri, 9
Reggio Emilia, Modena 41100
Italy
393313533645 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://personale.unimore.it/rubrica/dettaglio/f.pancotto

Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna di Pisa - Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM) ( email )

Piazza Martiri della Liberta, 33
Pisa, I-56127
Italy

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

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