Proprietary Costs and the Disclosure of Information About Customers

Journal of Accounting Research, Forthcoming

63 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2012  

Jesse A. Ellis

North Carolina State University

C. Edward Fee

Tulane University - A.B. Freeman School of Business

Shawn Thomas

University of Pittsburgh - Katz Graduate School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2, 2011

Abstract

In deciding how much information about their firms’ customers to disclose, managers face a trade-off between the benefits of reducing information asymmetry with capital market participants and the costs of aiding competitors by revealing proprietary information. This paper investigates the determinants of managers’ choices to disclose information about their firms’ customers using a comprehensive dataset of customer-information disclosures over the period 1976-2006. We find robust evidence in support of the hypothesis that proprietary costs are an important factor in firms’ disclosure choices regarding information about large customers.

Keywords: Proprietary Costs, Disclosure, Customers, Competition

JEL Classification: M41, L14

Suggested Citation

Ellis, Jesse A. and Fee, C. Edward and Thomas, Shawn, Proprietary Costs and the Disclosure of Information About Customers (November 2, 2011). Journal of Accounting Research, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1987576

Jesse A. Ellis

North Carolina State University ( email )

Poole College of Management
Campus Box 7229
Raleigh, NC 27695
United States
919-515-9670 (Phone)

C. Edward Fee

Tulane University - A.B. Freeman School of Business ( email )

7 McAlister Drive
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States

Shawn Thomas (Contact Author)

University of Pittsburgh - Katz Graduate School of Business ( email )

246 Mervis Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States
412-648-1648 (Phone)
412-648-1693 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.pitt.edu/~shthomas/index.htm

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