Subperfect Game: Profitable Biases of NBA Referees

Posted: 19 Jan 2012

See all articles by Joseph Price

Joseph Price

Brigham Young University

Marc Remer

Swarthmore College - Economics Department

Daniel F. Stone

Bowdoin College - Department of Economics

Date Written: Spring 2012

Abstract

This paper empirically investigates three hypotheses regarding biases of National Basketball Association referees. Identification of basketball referee bias is typically difficult as changes in observed statistics may be caused by either changes in referee bias or player behavior. We identify bias by exploiting the fact that referees have varying degrees of discretion over different types of a particular statistic‐turnovers. This allows us to conduct a treatment and control‐style analysis, using the less discretionary turnovers as the player behavior control. The results provide evidence that referees favor home teams, teams losing during games, and teams losing in playoff series. All three biases are likely to increase consumer demand.

Suggested Citation

Price, Joseph and Remer, Marc and Stone, Daniel F., Subperfect Game: Profitable Biases of NBA Referees (Spring 2012). Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 21, Issue 1, pp. 271-300, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1987967 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00325.x

Joseph Price

Brigham Young University ( email )

130 FOB
Provo, UT 84604
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://economics.byu.edu/directory/joseph-p-price

Marc Remer

Swarthmore College - Economics Department ( email )

Swarthmore, PA 19081
United States

Daniel F. Stone

Bowdoin College - Department of Economics ( email )

Brunswick, ME 04011
United States
6463387833 (Phone)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
1
Abstract Views
561
PlumX Metrics