Testing Canonical Tournament Theory: On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure
41 Pages Posted: 20 Jan 2012
Date Written: January 16, 2012
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an incentive effect from raising the winner’s prize. However, we also observed several empirical puzzles that appeared to contradict theory. Controlling for social preferences did not resolve the puzzles, although social preferences do influence behavior. It turns out that the puzzles can be explained by the canonical model once the textbook assumption of separable agent utility is relaxed.
Keywords: Tournaments, Experiment, Social Preferences, Contract Theory
JEL Classification: D03, D82, D86, M52, M55
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation