North-South Standards Harmonization and International Trade

30 Pages Posted: 20 Jan 2012

See all articles by Olivier Cadot

Olivier Cadot

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); World Bank

Anne-Célia Disdier

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Lionel Fontagne

University of Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne; Paris School of Economics; CEPII

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2012

Abstract

Recent years have seen a surge in regional trade agreements (RTAs) and the development of non-tariff measures (NTMs). As a consequence, a growing number of RTAs include provisions on NTMs. This paper investigates the effect of standards-harmonization clauses contained in many North-South Agreements on international trade. Using a gravity equation, we find that (i) North-South harmonization of technical regulations reinforces a hub-and-spoke trade structure potentially detrimental to the development of South-South trade and (ii) harmonization on regional standards hurts Southern exports to the North. Thus, standards-harmonization provisions included in many recent North-South RTAs miss their target and contribute to marginalize Southern countries in the world economy.

Keywords: harmonization, Regional trade agreement, South-South trade, technical regulations

JEL Classification: F13, F15

Suggested Citation

Cadot, Olivier and Disdier, Anne-Célia and Fontagne, Lionel, North-South Standards Harmonization and International Trade (January 2012). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8767, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1988698

Olivier Cadot (Contact Author)

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne) ( email )

Unil Dorigny, Batiment Internef
Lausanne, 1015
Switzerland
+41 21 692 3463 (Phone)
+41 21 692 3495 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Anne-Célia Disdier

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Lionel Fontagne

University of Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne ( email )

Maison des Sciences Economiques
106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital
Paris, 75013
France
+33 1 44 07 89 94 (Phone)
+33 1 53 68 55 01 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://lionelfontagne.weebly.com/

Paris School of Economics ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France
+33 1 44 07 89 94 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://lionelfontagne.weebly.com/

CEPII ( email )

9 Rue Georges Pitard
Paris, 75015
France
+33 1 53 68 55 06 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://lionelfontagne.weebly.com/

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
2
Abstract Views
539
PlumX Metrics