Institutions, Investor Protection, and Corporate Choices in Developing Economies

54 Pages Posted: 22 Jan 2012

See all articles by Rima Turk-Ariss

Rima Turk-Ariss

International Monetary Fund; Economic Research Forum

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 20, 2012

Abstract

This paper examines the extent to which differences in legal tradition, judicial efficiency, and investor protection affect debt financing and risk taking across developing economies. We find that firms in common law countries have the highest preference for debt financing while corporations in countries of socialist legal tradition assume the greatest levels of risk. Further, judicial efficiency matters most across developing economies. When legal formalism is high, firms contract more debt, but they are less willing to undertake risky investments. The “dark side” to strong creditor rights in bankruptcy also prevails in developing countries, but it is sector-dependent.

Suggested Citation

Turk-Ariss, Rima, Institutions, Investor Protection, and Corporate Choices in Developing Economies (January 20, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1988909 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1988909

Rima Turk-Ariss (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund ( email )

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