Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Hidden Costs? Malpractice Allegations and Defensive Medicine Among Cardiac Surgeons

41 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2012  

Barak D. Richman

Duke University - School of Law

Marco Huesch

Duke University - School of Medicine; Duke University - Fuqua School of Business

Date Written: January 20, 2012

Abstract

This article evaluates the impact of private allegations of malpractice against cardiac surgeons on their patients’ outcomes and characteristics. While tort law may impact observable physician costs, malpractice allegations also impose hidden costs that could also affect physician behavior. We employ a large and multi-year panel dataset and patient-level analysis to ascertain whether malpractice allegations influence a surgeon’s practicing behavior. Using a generalized difference-in-difference model that controls for unobserved patient heterogeneity, clustering of patients within surgeon offices, contemporaneous expected risk, and other patient variables, we measure whether an allegation of malpractices affects a physician’s service intensity and use of healthcare resources. Our results find no evidence that physician behavior was sensitive to allegations, findings of or settlements of malpractice claims. This is consistent with either low levels of defensive medicine in this specialty or pervasive and persistent practices — including defensive medicine — that are not significantly impacted by actual claims filed.

Suggested Citation

Richman, Barak D. and Huesch, Marco, Hidden Costs? Malpractice Allegations and Defensive Medicine Among Cardiac Surgeons (January 20, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1989035 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1989035

Barak D. Richman (Contact Author)

Duke University - School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7244 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)

Marco Huesch

Duke University - School of Medicine

United States

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business

Box 90120
Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
90
Rank
242,785
Abstract Views
751