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Homophily and Long-Run Integration in Social Networks

39 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2012 Last revised: 1 May 2012

Yann Bramoulle

Laval University - Département d'Économique

Sergio Currarini

University of Leicester - Department of Economics; Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia

Matthew O. Jackson

Stanford University - Department of Economics; Santa Fe Institute; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)

Paolo Pin

Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università degli Studi di Siena

Brian W. Rogers

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Date Written: April 2012

Abstract

We model network formation when heterogeneous nodes enter sequentially and form connections through both random meetings and network-based search, but with type-dependent biases. We show that there is "long-run integration," whereby the composition of types in sufficiently old nodes' neighborhoods approaches the global type distribution, provided that the network-based search is unbiased. However, younger nodes' connections still reflect the biased meetings process. We derive the type-based degree distributions and group-level homophily patterns when there are two types and location-based biases. Finally, we illustrate aspects of the model with an empirical application to data on citations in physics journals.

Keywords: Networks, Social Networks, Network Formation, Homophily, Segregation, Integration, Citations

JEL Classification: D85, A14, Z13

Suggested Citation

Bramoulle, Yann and Currarini, Sergio and Jackson, Matthew O. and Pin, Paolo and Rogers, Brian W., Homophily and Long-Run Integration in Social Networks (April 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1989560 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1989560

Yann Bramoulle

Laval University - Département d'Économique ( email )

Ste-Foy, Quebec G1K 7P4 G1K 7P4
Canada

Sergio Currarini

University of Leicester - Department of Economics ( email )

Department of Economics
Leicester LE1 7RH, Leicestershire LE1 7RH
United Kingdom

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy

Matthew O. Jackson (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
1-650-723-3544 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm

Santa Fe Institute

1399 Hyde Park Road
Santa Fe, NM 87501
United States

Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) ( email )

180 Dundas Street West, Suite 1400
Toronto, Ontario
Canada

Paolo Pin

Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università degli Studi di Siena ( email )

Piazza San Francesco 8
Siena, I53100
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/paolopin/

Brian W. Rogers

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www20.kellogg.northwestern.edu/facdir/facpage.asp?sid=10018

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