Optimal Attorney Advertising

26 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2012

See all articles by Michael P. Stone

Michael P. Stone

Quinnipiac University - Department of Economics

Thomas J. Miceli

University of Connecticut - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 1, 2011


Attorney advertising routinely targets tort victims. This paper reviews the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on attorney advertising, and develops a theoretical model that incorporates advertising intensity, litigation costs, and an endogenous number of lawsuits. Since advertising induces victims to bring suit, it increases the level of injurer care. However, litigation costs are also incurred. At the optimum, the marginal benefit of deterrence equals the sum of marginal litigation and advertising costs. Although blanket prohibitions on attorney advertising are likely to be suboptimal (consistent with the Court’s position), some regulations may be justified.

Keywords: Tort, Liability, Advertising, Attorneys, Lawyer, Legal Services

JEL Classification: K13, K41, L15, L84

Suggested Citation

Stone, Michael P. and Miceli, Thomas J., Optimal Attorney Advertising (July 1, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1989574 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1989574

Michael P. Stone (Contact Author)

Quinnipiac University - Department of Economics ( email )

275 Mount Carmel Avenue
Hamden, CT 06518
United States

Thomas J. Miceli

University of Connecticut - Department of Economics ( email )

365 Fairfield Way, U-1063
Storrs, CT 06269-1063
United States
860-486-5810 (Phone)
860-486-4463 (Fax)

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