Does Charter Competition Foster Entrepreneurship? A Difference-in-Difference Approach to European Company Law Reforms

40 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2012

See all articles by Lars Hornuf

Lars Hornuf

Technische Universität Dresden; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Horst Eidenmueller

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Andreas Engert

Freie Universität Berlin, Department of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Reiner Braun

Technische Universität München (TUM) - TUM School of Management; Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies

Date Written: May 1, 2011

Abstract

We study how company law reforms, particularly the reduction or abolition of minimum capital requirements, in various European jurisdictions affect the decision of entrepreneurs to incorporate by means of a private limited liability company (LLC). Since the landmark rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the years 1999, 2002 and 2003, entrepreneurs in the European Union (EU) have been able to choose the country of incorporation independently of their real seat. As a result, the proliferation of the UK private company limited by shares has posed a competitive threat to many European legislators. We analyze whether the reforms adopted in Spain, France, Hungary, Germany and Poland have promoted the popularity of domestic legal forms and encouraged entrepreneurship more generally. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we record a strong impact in both respects, especially if the minimum capital requirement was reduced or abolished.

Keywords: entrepreneurship, regulatory competition, charter competition, corporate mobility

JEL Classification: G38, K22

Suggested Citation

Hornuf, Lars and Eidenmueller, Horst G. M. and Engert, Andreas and Braun, Reiner, Does Charter Competition Foster Entrepreneurship? A Difference-in-Difference Approach to European Company Law Reforms (May 1, 2011). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 308/2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1990189 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1990189

Lars Hornuf (Contact Author)

Technische Universität Dresden ( email )

Dresden, 01307
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.hornuf.com

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Horst G. M. Eidenmueller

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )

St Cross Building
St Cross Road
Oxford, OX1 3UL
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Andreas Engert

Freie Universität Berlin, Department of Law ( email )

Boltzmannstr. 3
Berlin, 14195
Germany

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Reiner Braun

Technische Universität München (TUM) - TUM School of Management ( email )

Arcisstr. 21
Munich, Deutschland 80333
Germany
+498928925181 (Phone)
+498928925188 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ef.wi.tum.de/

Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies ( email )

Arcisstrasse 21
Munich, DE 80333
Germany

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