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Farewell to Conceptual Analysis (in Jurisprudence)

Andrei Marmor

Cornell University - Law School

January 23, 2012

USC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-2

I have two main purposes in this essay: First, to show that conceptual analysis is not nearly as central to legal philosophy as typically assumed. The main methodological thrust of analytical jurisprudence, and in particular of legal positivism, is reductionism, not conceptual analysis. Consequently, the main objections to legal positivism are best seen as arguing against the possibility of reduction. Second, I aim to show that the interpretivist challenges to analytical jurisprudence bark up the wrong tree in this respect, and actually fail to engage with the methodological stance they aim to replace. Along the way I offer a partial defense of reductionism and the limited essentialism that comes with it.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

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Date posted: January 24, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Marmor, Andrei, Farewell to Conceptual Analysis (in Jurisprudence) (January 23, 2012). USC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-2. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1990401

Contact Information

Andrei Marmor (Contact Author)
Cornell University - Law School ( email )
Myron Taylor Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853-4901
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/faculty/bio_andrei_marmor.cfm

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